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Contextualizing Patent Disclosure
Colleen V. Chien*
One of the main justificationsfor a patent system is that patents disclose
useful technical information that others can learn from. However, patents are
not performing this function well. The averagepatent is written in legalese, uses
vague language, and is hard to connect to commercial activity. Legal scholars
have responded with calls to improve the patent document through better
writing, more examples, and better enforcement of patent doctrines. The courts
have sought to ensure that patent specificationsare robust andjustify the grant
of a monopoly. This follows from the Supreme Court's characterizationof
technical teachings within a patent as the "quid pro quo" for the patentee's
exclusive rights.
The problem with these approaches is that they focus exclusively on
patent content, and overlook the many ways in which patent context matters to
the dissemination of technical information. A review of the ways in which
patents truly promote the progress reveal that patent information beyond, not
just within, a patent's four corners, can shape the extent to which the subject
invention of the patent spreads beyond the inventor. Whether a patent is in force,
is commercially important, is subject to licensing or other commitments, or is
held for defensive or offensive reasons, for example, can determine whether and
how the teachings within the patent spread.
In this Article, I argue that we need to rethink the concept of patent
disclosure. Rather than focusing only on the content of the patent, we should
keep in mind the context of the patent, and how the greater availability of
contextual information about the patent can promote the progress. This
contextual information represents not only the final "product"of a patent as
issued, but the "process"by which it is made and used, the timing and terms on
which it is provided to the world, and the publicly reported transactions in
which the patent is involved. Making contextual information more accessible
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would do much to reinvigorate the disclosure function of the patent system-in
many cases, using already existing information.
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INTRODUCTION

The word "patent," comes from the Latin, "patere," which means
"to lay open."1 One of the main justifications for the patent system is

1.
Patent, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=
patent (last visited Jan. 14, 2016) [https://perma.cc/3P9S-X2G9]; see also SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC

REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 1 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup) (describing the
noun "patent" as the customary abbreviation of "open letter" or "letters patent," a literal
translation of the Latin litteraepatentes) [hereinafter SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS ECONOMIC REVIEW].
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that exclusive rights are needed to induce innovators to lay open, or
disclose, technical information to the world. By adding the "fuel of
interest to the fire of genius," 2 the patent system encourages the
disclosure of non-rivalrous, non-excludable technical information that
would otherwise be kept secret. Like other "open" innovation systems
such as academic publication,3 the patent system rewards those who
not only make costly and risky investments in innovation but also share
this information in detail, spurring follow-on innovation.
Patent law provides protection that is in many ways stronger
and broader than trade secrecy or copyright: it can be enforced against
independent inventors and non-exact copies. But in return for this
protection, the invention must be disclosed, in enough detail that others
can make and use it. During the term of the patent, rivals can learn
from the technical descriptions in patents to design around, improve
upon, and otherwise reduce the cost of producing the invention. 4 They
may even practice the invention when the patent is in force, based on
licensed or unlicensed use. After the patent expires (or the patent
application goes abandoned), the world may freely use the information
therein. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has called patent
5
disclosure "the quid pro quo of the right to exclude."
But there are at least two problems with justifying the patent
system on the basis of patent documents. First, when inventors can
keep inventions or details secret, they will, by declining to apply for
patents or, in some cases, withholding key information from patent
applications. 6 This limits the scope of the patent system, some argue, to
inventions that would have been disclosed anyway, 7 while enabling
inventors to retain their most valuable secrets. Second, the patents that

Litteraepatentes, or "open letters," were public documents issued by a ruler that bestowed certain
rights, such as a rank, upon its subjects. Id. at 2.
Abraham Lincoln, Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions, Jacksonville, Illinois (Feb. 11,
2.
1859), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 10-11 (Don E. Fehrenbacher
ed., 1989).

3.

Kevin J. Boudreau & Karim R. Lakhani, "Open" Disclosure of Innovations, Incentives

and Follow-on Reuse: Theory on Processes of Cumulative Innovation and a Field Experiment in

ComputationalBiology, 44 RES. POL. 4, 5 (2015) (describing academic science, the patent system,
open source computing, and other innovation platforms as all open, but at different points within
the innovation process).
4.
Id. at 4.
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001).
5.
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 1, at 24-25 (advancing the idea
6.
that an inventor patents and discloses "only what he fears he cannot be kept secret").
7.
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 109.
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are filed are often relatively poor tools of teaching.8 The patent system
incents early disclosure by awarding those who are first to file their
applications at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO"), 9 but as a result, disfavors mature, complete disclosure, as the
invention is often still at the preliminary, pre-commercial stage at the
time of filing. Patents are written in ways that makes them hard to find
and understand. For example: a piece of bread becomes "a first bread
layer having a first perimeter surface coplanar to a contact surface," 10
and a computer becomes a "computing device having a physical patent
processor programmed with one or more computer program
instructions that, when executed, program the physical processor to
perform [a] method."" This is because, although patents are supposed
to function as technical documents, they are also legal documents, 12
often written by lawyers 13 and for lawyers, juries, and courts. It's no
wonder that technical personnel routinely rank patents below
publications and exchanges (e.g., with new employees, suppliers,
customers, competitors) as sources of technical information (Table 1).
There is a third problem with conceptualizing patent disclosure
exclusively in terms of the patent document, however, one that has
largely gone unnoticed. The problem is that traditional "patent
disclosure" theory is built on an incomplete understanding of how the
patent system actually supports the diffusion of technical knowledge.
Conventional accounts assume that the primary way the patent system
encourages the dissemination of technical information is through others
reading and learning from the patent.1 4 Academic proposals have
centered, accordingly, on improving the patent document.15 But
exclusively focusing on the content of the patent overlooks the
importance of the context of patent disclosures to the diffusion of
technical information. By context, I mean information about the patent

8.
Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 627
(2010) (proposing the use of working examples to improve the readability and teaching function of
patents).
9.
The transition of the United States, under the America Invents Act of 2011, from a "firstinventor-to-invent" system to the "first-inventor-to-file" system, with some exceptions, is detailed
in Robert P. Merges, Priorityand Novelty Under the AA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023 (2012).
10. U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 8, 1997).
11. U.S. Patent No. 8793159 (filed June 3, 2011).
12. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 543 (2009) (discussing the
two layers, technical and legal, within the patent document and arguing that they should be
separated).
13. They might also be written by legally trained technical specialists called patent agents.
14. This assumes it has run its full term-if it has not, other patents still in force may
preclude the follow-on innovator from practicing the invention.
15. See infra Part I.

2016]

CONTEXTUALIZING DISCLOSURE

1853

that is beyond, not just within, a patent's four corners. Contextual
information includes whether a patent is in force, commercially
important, practiced, subject to licensing or other commitments, or held
for defensive or offensive reasons, for example. Each influences how
teaching about the invention is (or is not) diffused during and after the
patent's term.
In this Article, I argue that we need to rethink the concept of
patent disclosure. Rather than focusing only on the content of the
patent, we should keep in mind the context of the patent, and how the
greater availability of contextual information about the patent can
promote the progress. This contextual information represents not only
the final "product" of a patent as issued, but also the "process" by which
it is made and used, the timing and terms on which it is provided to the
world, and the publicly reported transactions that the patent is involved
in. This information is not readily available at present, but making it.
so would do much to reinvigorate the disclosure function of the patent
system-in many cases, using already existing information. Removing
the current barrier to reading patents and defaulting to the earliest
practicable publication of applications could also greatly enhance
patent teaching, and in contrast to content-based proposals, do so
without requiring significant changes to the ways patents are written
and examined.
The context of a patent influences its reach. There may be a large
number of patents over how to pick the next best song for a listener, for:
example, but for a company building a music streaming service, the
patents that matter are the ones that are owned by their competitors or
that are being used in the market. To take another example, while there
may be any number of patented methods for connecting to a wireless
network, incorporation of a particular method into a standard
determines its adoption by others.
Building on such examples, this Article articulates and applies
a context- rather than content-based framework for understanding and
improving the contribution of the patent system to the diffusion of
technical information. Part I discusses conventional patent disclosure
theory and evidence. This review suggests that we should be skeptical
of the premise that disclosures within patents can justify the patent
system, and that suggested fixes to the content of patents alone can
overcome the numerous obstacles to learning from patents. It argues
that the relative success of chemistry and drug patents as instruments
of technical teaching are attributable not just to better content, but
better context-they are searchable and findable, are integrated into
databases of practice, and describe the commercial product years before
it is sold on the market.
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Part II builds upon Part I by arguing that pure content-based
approaches to improving patent disclosure are misguided because they
overlook the many ways that technical teaching occurs within the
patent system, but outside of the patent document. It details the
mechanisms by which patents lead to technical learning beyond the
patent document: by freeing up inventors to make ancillary disclosures
of the invention, by supporting the sale and transfer of technology, and
by creating freedom to operate. Policymakers should consider how to
encourage these modes of patent-supported diffusion, rather than just
improved patent document disclosures.
Part III explores the various layers of contextual patent
information and the relevance of each of these layers to the diffusion of
technical teaching described in Parts I and II. While conversations
about patent disclosure have mostly focused on a lack of quality content,
this Part focuses on the overlooked problem of the lack of patent
context. When available, contextual information can, for example,
signal which inventions are important from an economic point of view,
are unimportant from a risk management perspective (insofar as they
are expired or pledged to defensive uses), and may be the subject of
broader technology and know-how transfers. Making contextual
information more readily available could enhance the disclosure
function of the patent system and, in contrast to proposals to enhance
disclosure by substantially changing the way patents are written or
examined, leverages already available information in many cases.
Building upon Part III, Part IV suggests two other ways to improve the
context in which all patents are read that would not require additional
resources: first, by changing the default publication of patent
applications, including provisionals, to the earliest time agreed to by
the applicant, and second, by removing the penalty for reading patents.
I. CONVENTIONAL PATENT DISCLOSURE THEORY AND EVIDENCE

A. Brief History of Patent Disclosure
While the concept of disclosure has always been part of the
patent system, what qualifies as disclosure has varied over time. Early
systems considered inventions disclosed only when they were actually
done or produced, or when the device was provided to society. The
Venetian patent system, for example, granted patents to those who
made a new and ingenious device "when it has been reduced to
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perfection so that it can be used and operated." 16 The early British
patent system shared this emphasis on physical things, extending
patents only to "manufactures." 17 An 1837 description of the U.S.
system, likewise, restricted patents to inventions that had "been
reduced to practice; it is not enough that it is merely practicable or
possible; it must be something which has been actually done or
produced."18 Although the early U.S. patent system allowed for the
patenting of methods, not just devices, patent examiners had the right
to ask for small-scale models, 19 obtaining them in about half of the
patents that issued, over everything from nail cutting machines, to
presses, to boring machines. 20 The disclosure to society came not
exclusively within the patent document, but also outside of it.
As the patent system expanded and modernized, things
changed. The growth of the patent system required the Patent Office to
review thousands of patent applications quickly. Paper-based reviews
were more practical than physical evaluations of patent models, which,
by 1880, were no longer submitted. 2' In addition, patent specifications
were increasingly expected to contain enabling disclosure, 22 elevating
the importance of the text within, rather than outside of, the patent
document. Finally, the practice of using patent claims, or "peripheral
claiming," to delineate the scope of the patent became formalized over
time, 23 enabling inventors to expand the scope of their patents just by
claiming the patent differently and more abstractly. In 1906, the
Supreme Court confirmed that practicing an invention was not a
prerequisite to patenting it.24 As a result, what was written in the
patent became more important than what the inventor had actually
done.
The striking result of this evolution is that today, one need not
have made an invention in order to get, through the patent, exclusive

16.

Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 166, 176-77 (1948);

see also BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 21 (1967).

17. Michael Risch, America's FirstPatents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1297-98 (2012) (describing
the English Statute of Monopolies).
John F. Duffy, Reviving the PaperPatent Doctrine,98 CORNELL L. REV. 1359,1369 (2013)
18.
(citing WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 110-11 (1837)).
19.

See 35 U.S.C. § 114 (2012).

20. Risch, supra note 17, at 1309-10.
21. Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 70
n.83 (2010) (providing a history of the Patent Office's model requirement).
22. Duffy, supra note 18, at 1370-74.
23. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 721 (2009).
24. Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422-23 (1908) (confirming that
a patentee need not practice an invention to obtain a patent).
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rights to it.25 The lack of a working requirement has had significant
consequences for the patent system, influencing what gets patented,
when, and by whom. It lowers barriers to patenting, supports
specialization in innovation, and shifts patenting towards invention
and away from commercialization. It also means that those who win the
race to the PTO, generally earlier, have rights over those who are
successful in the market, generally later.
B. The Doctrines of Patent Disclosure
Consistent with an emphasis on "documentary disclosure,"26 an
inventor can now file a patent application that describes the invention
and thereby constructively reduce the invention to practice and satisfy
patent law's requirements. Several "disclosure" doctrines within patent
law are designed to ensure that the patent specification is sufficient,
including enablement, best mode, and written description. The
willfulness doctrine influences how follow-on innovators access patent
specifications.
According to the enablement doctrine, a patent must describe
the invention in enough detail that a person skilled in the art can
recreate it based on the patent. 27 While the patent need not comprise a
detailed blueprint, readers of the patent should be able to make and use
the invention without "undue experimentation." 28 The purpose of the
enablement requirement, codified in the international TRIPS
agreement, 29 is to ensure that the public is gaining from the patent
specification a level of knowledge that is commensurate with the scope
30
of the patent's claims.
The patent's "written description" encompasses the entirety of
the patent document by which the patent's validity is evaluated; the
related written description requirement requires a demonstration that

25. Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 61 (1998) ("It is well settled that an invention may
be patented before it is reduced to practice.").
26. Duffy, supra note 18, at 1361.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
28. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
29. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS] ("Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the
invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person
skilled in the art .. " (emphasis added)).
30. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citing Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
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the patentee possessed the claimed invention. 3 1 The test is whether one
of the claimed
of skill would think that the inventor had possession
32
specification.
the
reading
on
based
matter,
subject
Although patent law applies equally across all technology areas,
disclosure requirements are stricter for the so-called unpredictable arts,
like chemistry and biopharma, where slight alterations can produce
substantially different outcomes. In one well-known example from
patent law, adding salt to plastic fishing lures was seen as undesirable
because mixing salt with plastic can cause violent explosions. When an
inventor did so anyway and was able to devise a lure that stayed salty
in the water for longer, he was rewarded with a patent.3 3 In general,
the unpredictability of chemistry means that a protocol that works for
one compound does not necessarily work for another. 34 Merely providing
high-level descriptions in such fields, therefore, will not suffice; the
inventor must provide details that convey possession of the invention
and that it works as described. 35 In biotechnology, a heightened written
description requirement applies as well, under which, for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that
DNA cannot be claimed without disclosure of the DNA sequence. 36 In
contrast, in a "predictable art" like computer science, a high-level
description can readily be reduced to practice by a person with ordinary
programming and technical skills, without undue experimentation. As
a result, less is required of specifications in the predictable arts and
more of patents in the unpredictable arts. As described below, this has
had implications for the examination and reuse of such patents.
Finally, the "best mode" requirement goes beyond the
enablement requirement and requires a description of the best way the
claimant knows of making the invention at the time of the patent
application. 37 Courts apply a two-step test to determine whether the
best mode has been adequately disclosed: "whether, at the time of filing
the application, the inventor possessed a best mode for practicing the
invention," and "whether the written description disclosed the 3best
mode such that one reasonably skilled in the art could practice it."

31.
32.
33.

Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 957-58 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

34.

Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV.

127, 137 (2008).
35. See, e.g., id. at 137-38.
36. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) ("The specification shall.., set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.").
38. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

1858

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:6:1849

But while the United States and a few other countries 39 require
more of patent disclosures than do others through the best mode
requirement, American patent law also discourages innovators from
reading patents during their term. Although patent infringement is
generally a strict liability offense, without regard to the accused
infringer's state of mind,40 having knowledge of a patent has historically
influenced the risk that an accused infringer will owe treble damages
for infringement of the patent. 4 1 As a result of the Supreme Court's Halo
decision, which did away with any particular rigid rule, courts have
wide discretion to award treble damages to those who engage in
"egregious conduct" and improperly appropriate the patent. 42
Historically, there has been a much higher likelihood of treble damages
being made based on actual knowledge of the patent. 43 Perhaps in part,
as a result, knowledge of the patent is only alleged thirty percent of the
time. 44 The penalty for reading patents extends beyond the risk of treble
45
damages, to the award of attorney's fees as well.
39. See Bingbin Lu, Best Mode Disclosure for Patent Applications: An International and
Comparative Perspective, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 409, 409 (2011) (describing analogous
requirements in Japan, China, and India).

40.

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).

41. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) ("[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed."); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting
that, in the absence of statutory guidance, the Federal Circuit has held that "proof of willful
infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at least a showing of objective recklessness").
42. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932-34 (2016) (easing the
standard to prove willful infringement).
43.
See, e.g., NAT'L JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.1
(2009), http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/NationalPatentJurylnstructions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J9J7-BXWZ] (explaining to juries that "[w]hen considering [the alleged
infringer]'s conduct, you must decide whether [the patent holder] has proven it is highly probable
that [the alleged infringer]'s conduct was reckless; that is, that [the alleged infringer] proceeded
with the allegedly infringing conduct with knowledge of the patent..."(emphasis added)); Randy
R. Micheletti, Willful PatentInfringement After In Re Seagate: Just What Is "Objectively Reckless"
Infringement?, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 975, 1008:
Knowledge of the patent at issue should remain a critically important factor in the
Seagate analysis, however, because such knowledge may create an inference that the
defendant knew or should have known of the risk of infringement. Conversely, proving
an infringer should have known of the risk that he would infringe the patent at issue
becomes very difficult-if not impossible-if the defendant had no knowledge of the
patent at all.
44. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421, 1442 (2009) (reporting that, "[o]f... 193 cases, only 60 (or 31.1%) involved allegations that
the defendant was even aware of the patent before the lawsuit").
45.
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (specifying that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party"). One way to show that a case is "exceptional" is
by showing that the defendant engaged in "willful infringement." See, e.g., Minks v. Polaris Indus.,
546 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (upholding exceptional case determination and award of
attorney fees based on jury finding of willful infringement); Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess
Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that an express finding of willful
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C. The Usefulness of Patent Disclosures-theEvidence
For critics of patent disclosure, the main question is whether, as
the Supreme Court has asked, the "additions to the general store of
knowledge" provided by patents are in fact worth the "high price of...
exclusive use," as the Supreme Court has claimed. 46 There are reasons
to be skeptical. In his comprehensive economic review of the patent
system in 1952, Professor Fritz Machlup explained the factors that
undermine the patent system's disclosure function:
[T]he unwillingness of firms to patent what they think they may be able to keep secret;
the unwillingness of researchers to publish what they think they may later develop into
patentable inventions; the ability of inventors to obtain patents despite incomplete
disclosure; and the inability of manufacturers to keep secret most of the technology they
in granting monopolies for the disclosure of
use and, consequently, society's munificence
47
what would become known in any case.

Patent disclosure has few contemporary defenders. It is routinely'
asserted that few read patents, 48 and there have been few concerted
efforts to change this impression. 49 Those who find patents inadequate
in the software realm, for example, have arguably been more focused on
invalidating rather than improving patents. Documentary disclosure
has been dealt a significant blow in recent years. Following passage of
the America Invents Act, a lack of best mode is no longer a defense to
enforcement. 50 This evisceration of the best mode requirement postenactment was prompted by concerns that the, doctrine was too
burdensome to litigate. 51 But rather than improve the best mode,
requirement, policymakers decided to significantly denude it by making
the lack of a best mode no longer a defense to a patent's enforceability,
52
in a move that was surprisingly uncontroversial at the time.
Based on the evidence, detailed below, much of the pessimism is
justified. Patents generally rank below other sources of information in
infringement is a sufficient basis for classifying a case as "exceptional," and that when a trial court
denies attorney fees in spite of a finding of willful infringement, the court must explain why the
case is not "exceptional" within the meaning of the statute).
46. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-84 (1974).
47. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS ECONOMIC REVIEW, supranote 1, at 32.
48. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (popularizing
the idea that no one reads patents).
49. See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text (describing two empirical efforts to better
understand the extent to which innovators read patents and citing surveys done by Ouellette et
al.).
50. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 15, § 282, 125 Stat. 284, 328
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012)).
51. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: PartII of II, 21
FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 581-82 (2012).
52. Id. (discussing the repeal of the best-mode defense).
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terms of importance, and there are reasons to believe that patent law's
enablement standard is not always being enforced. Surveyed
researchers cite many of the same obstacles Professor Fritz Machlup
described decades ago: that the information in patents is repetitive of
other sources and written in obscure language by those who want to
hide information. 53 However, the answer also, to some extent, depends
on the industry. Chemists save time when they read patents, electrical
engineers, less so. 54 It is easier to find relevant chemical patents, and
they are the type most frequently cited by research papers, followed by
biopharma patents. 55 These and other findings, and their implications,
are discussed below.
1. The Comparative Value of Patent Disclosures
Surveys of the patent system convey a generally dim view of
patent disclosures as compared to other sources of technical teaching.
In the 1987 'Yale survey" of 650 publicly traded firms, patents placed
sixth out of seven types of disclosures. 56 Professor Stuart MacDonald,
surveying small and medium enterprises in the United Kingdom, 57
found that patent disclosures trailed other sources of information such
as customers, suppliers, competitors, trade associations, universities,
professional associations, and research associations as sources of useful
information. 58 Professor Wesley Cohen and others surveyed
manufacturing firms in the 1990s, including 826 firms in the United
States and 593 in Japan, and found strong differences in these
populations regarding the usefulness of patent disclosures for
disseminating technical information. 59

53. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 545, 557-58 (2012).
54. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics of Patents
17-18 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w17773, 2012) ("In fields where patents
have strong impact on appropriability such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, disclosure effects
appear to matter the most.").
55. Wolfgang Glinzel & Martin Meyer, Patents Cited in the Scientific Literature: An
Exploratory Study of 'Reverse' CitationRelations, 58 SCIENTOMETRICS 415, 415-19 (2003).
56. Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 783, 806.
57.
STUART MACDONALD, WHAT THE PATENT SYSTEM OFFERS THE SMALL FIRM 5 (1998)

(summary report for the Economic and Social Research Council).
58. Id. at 5-6.
59. Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Patents,and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan
and the United States, 31 RES. POL'Y 1349, 1355-62 (2002).

1861

CONTEXTUALIZING DISCLOSURE

2016]
TABLE

1: How

Levin* (1987)
Processes

PATENTS COMPARE TO OTHER SOURCES OF
INFORMATION (RELATIVE RANK)

Levin* (1987) Products McDonald (1988)
SMEs

Cohen (2002) US

1. Independent R&D

1. Independent R&D

1. Customers

1. Publications

2. Licensing
Technology

2. Reverse Engineering

2. Suppliers

2. Informal
Exchange

3. Publications or
Technical Meetings

3. Licensing
Technology

3. Competitors

3, Patents

3. Reverse Engineering

4. Hiring

4. Trade
Associations

4. Meetings or
Conferences

5. Hiring

5. Publications or
Technical Meetings

5. Universities

5. Others'
Products

6. Patents

6. Patents

6. Professional
Associations

6. Joint Ventures

7. Conversations with
employees

7. Conversations with
employees

7. Research
Associations

7. Trade
Associations

8. Patents
9. Gov't
Departments

Patent disclosures were the single most important channel of
information for Japanese firms, scoring more than twenty percent

higher than the next most important channel, publications. 60 In the
United States, patents ranked only third, well behind publications and
informal information exchange and just barely ahead of public
61
meetings, conferences, and competitors' products.

60.

Id. at 1363. The high rate of dependence on patent disclosures by Japanese firms may be

explainable, in part, to the lower grant rate of patents-a study of patent applications filed in the
United States and several other jurisdictions and granted in the United States found that Japan
only awarded patent applications on 42.6 percent of the applications that the United States did.
This means that for a larger number of Japanese patents, the follow-on innovator is not precluded
from practice by a patent. See Paul H. Jensen, Alfons Palangkaraya & Elizabeth
Webster, Application Pendency Times and Outcomes Across Four Patent Offices 11-13 (Melbourne
Inst. of Applied Econ. & Soc. Research, Working Paper No. wp2008nO6, 2008).
61. Cohen et al., supra note 59, at 1363.
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There remain legitimate questions about the extent to which we
can accurately discern the contribution of patents to the storehouse of
knowledge. As Professor Robert Merges recounts, though innovators
may discount learning from patents, "inadvertent plagiarism" can
occur, for example, when a follow-on innovator reads a related patent
but does not cite or value its contribution. 62 Another shortcoming of
many of these surveys is that they were completed in the 1980s and
1990s, and the rise of internet and digital communications since then
has made it easier to discover technical information through modes
such as conferences, whose proceedings are now often recorded and
posted; informal exchanges, which can take place over social media; and
written disclosures, which now can be more readily accessed through
digitization and search.
2. The Enforceability of Doctrinal Requirements
It is unclear the extent to which issued patents in fact satisfy the
enablement and written description requirements. The enablement
inquiry is complex and fact intensive-requiring a patent examiner to
put herself in the shoes of a skilled inventor and to determine whether
the specification includes enough information so that the invention
could be made and used "without undue experimentation." But the
rapid pace of technological change makes it hard for patent examiners
to channel and apply the knowledge of such a skilled inventor to the
task of examination. "Possession," the written description standard, is
to be evaluated by a person of skill in the art but patent examiners must
provide their best guess of how such a person would evaluate the
application. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the challenge of
evaluating the sufficiency of disclosure "in light of the highly developed
art of drafting patent claims so that they disclose as little useful
information as possible ... while broadening the scope of the claim as
widely as possible ....
The available evidence suggests that examiners and courts
relatively infrequently reject or invalidate patents based on a lack of
enabling disclosure. For example, according to a study of patent
applications, of all grounds of rejection, 64 enablement was the least used
ground for rejection among bioinformatics applications and the second-

62. Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law,
31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 17-20 (2016).
63. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
64. Grounds for rejection included the patentability of the subject matter, novelty,
obviousness, best mode, written description, and definiteness.
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to-least used by examiners among data-processing applications.6 5 Based
on an analysis of published district court decisions from 2008 to
2009, enablement and written description were among the least
asserted grounds for invalidity during litigation. 66 When patents were
scrutinized for the sufficiency of the disclosure contained within them,
software patents covering nonbusiness method inventions fared worse
than others, according to a study of disclosure rulings in 1,144 court
decisions from 1982 to 2012.67
The lack of rejections could reflect that disclosures are mostly
adequate, or it could reflect that it is harder, relative to other ways of
rejecting patents, to assess whether a patent provides enough
information to reproduce the invention. The nature of the examination
process puts the burden of proof on the examiner to allege that
disclosures are inadequate, rather than on the applicant to show that
her disclosure actually teaches. 68 The little evidence available about
reproducibility is not encouraging. In her study of two hundred
nanotechnology researchers, Professor Lisa Larrimore Ouellette found
that only thirty-eight percent of those who read patents responded "yes"
to the question of whether the invention was reproducible, 69 as required
by the law.
3. The (Variable) Value of Patent Disclosures
As to the broader question of whether patents ever contain
useful information, the answer appears to be, it depends. Industry
effects are strong. Variation by technology area in the value of patent
disclosures is documented in a forthcoming study by Professor Dietmar
Harhoff and his colleagues. Inventors from the United States, Europe,
and Asia were asked to quantify the time saved in their respective
invention processes due to the availability of patent information. The
answer depended on the industry. Though the median time savings was
5.9 hours and the mean was 12.2 hours, in the field of organic chemicals,

65. Saurabh Vishnubhakat & Arti K. Rai, When Biopharma Meets Software: Bioinformatics
at the Patent Office, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 205, 231-36 (2015).
66. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of
Modern Litigation,92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1785 (2014).
67. John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness
and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 646-47 (2016).
68. See Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 1015
(2013) (arguing that the nature of the patenting process, which requires examiners to make
affirmative rejections, creates a presumption of patentability that examiners must rebut in order
to deny patents).
69. Ouellette, supra note 53.
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the average time savings from reading a patent was thirty-six hours. 70
In contrast, survey takers reported an average saving in digital
communication technology of only one hour from reading a patent. 71 The
use of chemistry patents as technical sources of information is also
reflected in studies of citation patterns by scientific researchers. 72 In
their study of the thirty thousand PTO patents cited by research
articles, Professors Gldnzel and Meyer found that chemical patents
captured a majority of the citations. 73 Drug and medical patents were
also highly cited. 74 Among individual patents, content mattered. When
surveyed, researchers found the inclusion of details from practice-for
example, the choice of equipment, implementation protocols, and
recipes-to be most useful. 75 This suggests that practiced inventions,
and the sharing of information about their practice, added most.
In light of the foregoing, scholars have suggested a variety of
ways of improving patent disclosure. These include better writing, 76
working examples, 77 the use of peer review, 78 and the enhanced
enforcement of existing standards. 79 The PTO has trained its examiners
to apply more scrutiny to the examination of overly broad claims,
particularly in the context of software,8 0 and initiated a glossary pilot
program in which patent seekers can include definitions of the terms of
their patents.8 1 In 2015, the PTO, under the auspices of Director
Michelle Lee's patent quality initiative, announced further moves to
make the patent record clear and to train examiners in the adequacy of

70.
Hall & Harhoff, supra note 54, at 18 (describing a forthcoming publication by Alfonse
Gambardella, Dietmar Harhoff & Sadao Nagaoka, The Social Value of Patent Disclosure
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with LMU Munich)).
71. Id.
72. Glanzel & Meyer, supra note 55.
73. Id. at 415. Although, note that the authors did not quantify the number of citable
chemistry patents.
74. Id. However, the authors did not quantify the share of all citable patents that were
chemical, drug, or medical, making it impossible to rule out that one of the causes of the large
share of citations was their large share in the general population.
75. Ouellette, supra note 53, at 575.
76. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 12, at 563-84 (recommending that patents be written using
a structured approach to improve clarity and comprehensibility).
77. See, e.g., Seymore, supra note 8, at 627.
78. Ouellette, supra note 53, at 590-92.
79. See Fromer, supra note 12, at 544.
80.
USPTO-led Executive Actions on High Tech Patent Issues, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
(Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/uspto-led-executive-actions-high-techpatent-issues [https://perma.cc/LQ2J-X2XM] (executive action 2).
81. Glossary Initiative, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/
patent/initiatives/glossary-initiative [https://perma.cc/X4JA-DR4R].
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patent disclosures.8 2 The courts have taken modest steps to reign in
vagueness in claiming, such as requiring a patent claim's scope be
discernible with "reasonable certainty" and discouraging unsupported
"functional claiming," the practice of claiming broadly and describing
83
vaguely, without detailed examples or descriptions.
But greater clarity and more details, will not, by themselves,
make patents more valuable as sources of information. What makes
chemical and drug patents good tools of teaching arguably has as much
to do with their context, and the comparative advantages of chemical
patent disclosures relative to other sources of technical information, as
it does their content. For example, because drugs cannot be sold without
obtaining regulatory approvals for safety and efficacy, they are often
patented long before they are introduced to the market. Competitors
can therefore learn from the patent years before they can learn directly
from the product. In technology areas where product lifecycles are
short, and corresponding patents are hard to find, the opposite can be
true. The product may be close to obsolete by the time the patent is
finally granted, making it more feasible to learn from a technology
product itself than the patent disclosure.
In addition, the uncertain nature of chemical innovation leads to
greater experimentation prior to patenting, which leads, in turn, to
greater disclosure of details from practice that are not otherwise easily
publicly available. Finally, the ability of follow-on innovators to locate
and to read relevant patents represents another way in which
contextual information, in this case, indexable information, matters.
The best description is of limited use to society if it cannot be found.
There are limited ways to refer to biopharmaceutical structures and
building blocks, and searches are perceived to be reliable.8 4 Chemical
patents are well integrated into widely used databases of scientific
literature,8 5 and pharmaceutical companies are required to provide

82.
Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative: Moving Forward, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.:
DIRECTOR'S F.: A BLOG FROM USPTO's LEADERSHIP (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.uspto.govblog/
director/entry/enhanced-patent-quality-initiative-moving [https://perma.cc/C344-U2X8].
83. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 770 F.3d 1371, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Reyna,
J., dissenting).
FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
84.
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 91-92 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

reports/evolving-ip -marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-andremedies-competition-reportfederaltrade/110307patentreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/F32C-CQVS].
85. See, e.g., Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 297 n.23 (2012) (describing the STN International database, which is
available at http://www.stn-international.de/index.php?id=123 [https://perma.cc/5979-ML28]).
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patent data to the FDA for listing in its "Orange Book."8 6 In contrast,
software and high technology patents, because of the non-standard
ways in which technology components are described, have been
described as "non-indexable."8 7 There is no "Orange Book" for
technology patents.88 Even when relevant patents can be located,
innovators need to be able to read them in order to learn from them.
But as described above, the law of treble damages creates risks for
innovators.
The foregoing description of patent disclosure theory and
practice suggests that while there is much room for improvement, there
are limits to the usefulness of exclusively focusing on improving the
content within patents. Patents fail to teach for a wide variety of
reasons-they are poorly written; they are not detailed enough; they
describe nascent, early stage technology with few working exa~iples;
they cannot be found; and they cannot be read. The likelihood of
teaching is more favorable in some areas of technology, and with respect
to some patents and inventions, than others. As the next Part details,
fortunately, contextual information can help improve the likelihood of
knowledge transfer through the patent. It can also improve the
diffusion of technical information through the patent system, but
outside of the patent.
II. RETHINKING AND BROADENING
THE CONCEPT OF PATENT DISCLOSURES
Part I identified some of the structural problems with the
concept of patent disclosure. Much of the development of a patented
technology happens after the patent has been filed, when the
applicant's ability to supplement the specification ends.8 9 Many patents
are never practiced and have little to no present commercial value, and
the value of patent disclosures is likewise skewed. While I do not
necessarily believe that the challenges are so great that the disclosure
rationale for the patent system should be abandoned, as some have
86. Orange Book Preface, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 10, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm [https://perma.ccIY7PBB782].
87. See Mulligan & Lee, supra note 85, at 310; Ouellette, supra note 53, at 571.
88. Not yet, at least. In this symposium volume, Jeanne Fromer explores the idea. See
Jeanne Fromer, Dynamic Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1715 (2016). Also, the marking
doctrine, described infra at Part III, rewards those who practice their patents for disclosing
product-patent links.
89. In accordance with the "no new matter" doctrine under patent law, which nevertheless
allows for amendments to the claims to be made. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2012) ("No amendment
shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention.").
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suggested, 90 I do think that an exclusive focus on documentary
disclosure is unwarranted as a matter of law and policy, and in this Part
I argue for rethinking and broadening the concept of patent disclosure.
The law has long encouraged ongoing dissemination of the
invention outside of the four corners of the patent, primarily through
practice. For years after the Supreme Court confirmed that inventions
did not have to be implemented to be patented, patent law nevertheless
retained a preference for practiced patents, which Professor John Duffy
has recounted by chronicling the "paper patents doctrine." 91 According
to this doctrine, patents that were not being worked by their patentees
received worse treatment under the law-they were construed more
narrowly and were more likely to be held invalid than other patents.
The inverse was also true-patents that were successfully
commercialized were favored in determinations of scope and patent
validity.9 2 And though this doctrine has receded in importance, patent
law continues to incent the disclosure of the invention outside of the
93
patent. Under the doctrine of nonobviousness, commercial success,
licensing, and copying of the invention by others, all factors which can
only be accomplished by putting the invention into practice, weigh in
favor of an invention's patentability.9 4 In order to be entitled to the
remedy of lost profits, the patentee must demonstrate actual loss, which
95
can only be proven if the patentee is selling a competing product.
Even the defining right of a patent, the right to exclude, has
come to depend to some degree on whether the patent is actually
practiced. For years, courts granted injunctions to owners of infringed
patents as a matter of course.9 6 However, ever since the Supreme Court
decided the eBay case, courts need to consider a variety of factors90. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, The MisunderstoodFunction of Disclosurein PatentLaw, 23 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 401, 404 (2010) (advocating for the demotion of the disclosure rationale of the patent
system from a primary justification to an ancillary benefit); Benjamin N. Roin, Note, The
Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2007-08
(2005) (calling for the abandonment of that which cannot be improved).
91. Duffy, supranote 18, at 1386.
92. Id. at 1360.
93. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 285-87 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S.
398 (2007).
94. Natalie A. Thomas, Note, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The
Use of Objective Indicia following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070 (2011) (describing the
use of such objective secondary considerations as evidence of nonobvious).
95.
35 U.S.C § 284 (2012); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
The patent owner must also prove a decline in sales due to the infringement and that he would
have been capable of fulfilling the demand by the infringer.
96. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the PublicInterest, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 fig.1 (2012) (showing a pre-eBay injunction grant rate of close to ninety-five
percent).
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including irreparable harm, the absence of an adequate legal remedy,
the balance of hardships, and the public interest-when deciding
whether to grant an injunction. When patents are not practiced by the
patent holder, the odds of an injunction plummet, because the
inadequacy of money damages cannot be proven. 97
Consistent with the incentives the patent system has
historically offered for practice of the invention, I believe that the
concept of patent disclosure should be broadened to include
mechanisms for promoting the progress of science and the useful arts
outside of the four corners of the patent. The filing of a patent enables
the patentee to talk about and to publish the technology even as it
evolves or teach or work with a licensee to implement it.98 If the
invention is practiced, members of the public can learn from this
practice, potentially in combination with the patent, and adopt the
technology lawfully if they have the patentee's permission. To the
extent that patents 99 free up inventors to make ancillary disclosures
that they otherwise would keep secret, it may be the case that, though
ranked low among sources of information, patents are supporting access
to higher-ranked sources of information including publications,
informal exchanges, and licenses (Table 1).
A broadened conception of patent disclosure has several
benefits. It recognizes that patents are part of a broader universe of
technical teachings and documents and that situating patent
disclosures within this universe is an important way to improve access
to the ideas within them. It reveals opportunities to improve the patent
system not only by requiring patents to be fundamentally rewritten, but
also by paying more attention to the important, varied, and largely
overlooked ways in which patents can promote progress during and
after their term. This is important because the benefit to society from
improving patent documents is self-limiting-if inventors are required
to disclose too much, they will opt out of the patent system. 100 Below I

97. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); Chien & Lemley, supra
note 96, at 10 fig. 1 (showing a post-eBay contested injunction rate among patent assertion entities
to be seven percent).
98. Jason Rantanen, PeripheralDisclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (2012).
99. Because companies have powerful incentives to disclose-for example, to establish their
reputation or brand among competitors, or in order to sign licensing deals-it can be hard to know
exactly how much information would have been disseminated in the absence of the patent. Within
a particular company, for example, it may be the case that scientists want to disclose, but
managers want protection for the business before they do so. It is hard to know what exchanges
would have happened in the absence of the patent.
100. See, e.g., Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneursand the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1313 tbl.2
(2009) (reporting that fifty-nine percent of biotechnology start-up respondents to the Berkeley
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discuss three ways in which technical information is diffused through
the patent system outside of the patent document: ancillary technical
disclosures related to the patent (like publications and licensing
discussions), the transfer of the technology through patent licenses, and
public commitments. When coupled with patents, these disclosures
promote freedom to operate that I believe should be regarded, alongside
reading patents, as forms of patent system disclosure worth
encouraging.
A. Ancillary Disclosures
Ancillary disclosures are technical disclosures that are related
to the patent and build upon or enhance technical teaching within the
patent. In some contexts, such as academic publishing, these
disclosures would likely have happened anyway. In other contexts,
however, the presence of the patent enables the patentee to make
disclosures she would otherwise be reluctant to make. A number of
historical examples cited by Professor Petra Moser illustrate how the
presence of patents can free up, and a lack of patents can limit, the
dissemination of technical information. 10 1 For example, iron foundry
technology was advertised freely in nineteenth-century England, but
only after it was patented. 10 2 In contrast, unpatented silk twisting
technology was guarded, literally to the death, by silk weavers from
Bologna fearful that their Venetian counterparts would find out about
it.103 Without patents, Pennsylvanian mechanics had to rely on family
relations to disseminate information about cotton technology. 10 4 While
patents are usually conceptualized as forcing inventors to reveal
secrets, Professor Jason Rantanen has recognized instead that "many
inventors want to share information about their inventions and the
patent system facilitates this in ways that would not be possible in its
absence." 10 5 For example, within a firm, corporate managers and
engineers are often at cross-purposes, with the former wanting to keep
information proprietary in order to support comparative advantages,

Patent Survey reported that their last decision not to patent was motivated by their desire not to
disclose the invention, and that only twenty-five percent of software start-ups had this concern).
101. Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History, 27 J. ECON.
PERSP. 23, 32 (2013).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Rantanen, supra note 98, at 7 (emphasis removed).
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and the latter wanting to share and participate in the community. 10 6
Patenting can support this sharing, by allowing engineers to contribute
to and access information from the broader technical community while
deterring copying of the product.
B. Technology Licenses
A justification for the patent system is that the patent system
facilitates "markets for technology," accelerating the diffusion of
inventions to new applications. When firms can trade, they need not
have the full suite of assets needed to develop and commercialize
innovation themselves. Markets for technology have grown at a rate
substantially higher than the growth rate of the world GDP since the
mid-1990s. Based on survey evidence from Europe and Japan, about
07
twenty to twenty-five percent of firms engage in licensing activity.
Technology licenses effect the transfer of technology from one setting to
another through a variety of arrangements. Complex technologies are
built upon standards, in which groups of patent holders agree to make
their patents available to each other and to third parties on agreedupon-often reasonable and non-discriminatory ("RAND")-terms.
Licensing deals are common in the biopharma industry1 08 and enable
the promising leads developed by start-up firms or universities to be
cultivated with the resources and experience of larger and older
companies. 10 9 Agreements to share technology can be exclusive or nonexclusive and can be embedded into larger strategic alliances, joint
ventures, or partnerships that can cover both already developed and tobe-developed technology. 110
The knowledge reflected in a patent is typically only a small part
of what is required to practice the technology. Patents can bring
transacting parties to the table, paving the way for the transfer of tacit
106. JESSICA M. SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH 184-220 (2014) (documenting the tension
between lawyers, who are perceived as obstructionist, secretive, and, exclusionary, and the
scientists and engineers within firms, whose impulse it is to share and collaborate).
107. Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, Ideas for Rent: An Overview of Markets for
Technology, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 775, 780 (2010).

108. BCG's Biopharmaceutical Partnering Survey-2012 Results, BOSTON CONSULTING
GROUP 3 (Nov. 2012), http://documents.bcg.com/BCGLicensing-2012-GENERAL-vFinal.pdf
[https://perma.ccM89P-U272] (documenting between approximately eight hundred and nine
hundred deals per year in the 2008-2011 period).
109. See Invent It, Swap It, or Buy It: Why Constant Dealmaking Among Drugmakers Is
Inevitable, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21632676-

why-constant-dealmaking-among-drugmakers-inevitable.invent-it-swap-it-or-buy-it
[https://perma.cc/AH7F-UKG9].
110. See Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform,
J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 142 (2002).
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knowledge and other details from practice through the course of the
licensing relationship."' Disclosures made during the course of license
negotiations are of particular importance. According to information
theory, patents facilitate transactions by increasing trust.1 2 Within
this scheme, patents provide a solution to the Arrow information
paradox. This is the idea that in the absence of special legal protection,
an owner cannot sell information to someone who can make better use
of it, because, in the process of selling the information, he will have to
disclose it, and the buyer will not need to pay for it anymore.11 3 When
the buyer is an investor who must also trust the seller to make a return
on the idea, the result has been called a "double trust dilemma," in
which a transaction will not happen unless the innovator trusts the
investor with the idea, and the investor trusts the innovator with her
money.114

C. Freedom to Operate
While the diffusion of technology pursuant to a patent license is
generally limited to the licensee, acts like defensive patenting, crosslicensing, patent pledges, and patent nonrenewal or forbearance can
support broader technology flows. Though patents provide the right to
exclude, they can also, when coupled with commitments to not enforce,
be used to include others in the practice of the invention. They can also
support the patentee's freedom to operate.
Holding patents defensively can support access to the technology
of others in two ways. Having patents to retaliate with in the event of a
lawsuit deters suits from others in the first place. These patents can
also be cross-licensed to enable both sides to practice the other's
patents. Being able to access the technology of others is so important
that it motivates forty-five to sixty percent of patent holders to get
111. See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
OrganizationalIntegration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1523-24 (2012).
112. As Robert Merges describes, "To sell, one must disclose the information, but once the
information is disclosed, the recipient has the [sic] it and need not buy it. On the other hand, if one
does not disclose anything the buyer has no idea what is for sale." Robert Merges, Intellectual
Property Rights and BargainingBreakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75,
81(1994).
113. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (1962). But see Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information
Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 227-28 (2012) (criticizing the conventional
premise that intellectual property can be justified on the basis of its limited ability to resolve
Arrow's paradox).
114. ROBERT D. COOTER & HANS-BERND SCHAFER, SOLOMON'S KNOT: How LAW CAN END THE
POVERTY OF NATIONS 27 (2012).
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patents. 115 Those that hold overlapping patents enjoy greater freedom
to practice each other's technology. The practice of defensive patenting,
while particularly pervasive in areas like semiconductors and hightechnology, where incremental advances build upon each other, is also
a feature of biotechnology patenting. 116 As more and more areas of
innovation depend on incremental, technology-based advances, the
practice may become even more widespread. Cross-licensing, through
which parties agree to share technology and forbear from suing each
other in service of patent "d~tente," formally secures this freedom to
11 7
operate.
While defensive patenting supports reciprocal forbearance and
freedom, patent "pledges," or promises, represent unilateral acts to
provide others with the freedom to practice their patents. For example,
in a recent blog post entitled All Our PatentAre Belong To YOU,118 Tesla
Motors pledged to "open source" its patents and make them freely
available,1 19 stating that the real competition was not the "small trickle"
of non-Tesla electric cars, but the "enormous flood of gasoline cars
pouring out of the world's factories every day." 120 Following that
announcement, Toyota declared it was opening its hydrogen-car
patents; 121 the LG group announced that it would share its twenty-nine
thousand patents with small- and medium-sized companies and make
another 3,058 freely available to start-ups;1 22 Panasonic moved to open
up its source code, technology, and patents in order to expedite R&D
about the "Internet of Things;" 123 and a branch of the conglomerate
Daewoo stated it would share patents and know-how relating to

115. Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law, 89
S. CAL. L. REV. 793, 795 (2016).
116. SILBEY, supra note 106, at 44-45, 51.
117. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 308 (2011) (describing the
various ways in which patents are used to secure freedom to operate).
118. Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA MOTORS: BLOG (June 12, 2014),
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you [https://perma.ccW3HL-SVZC].
119. Id.

120. Id.
121. Sebastian Blanco, Toyota Follows Tesla, Makes Hydrogen Patents Open Source,
AUTOBLOG (Jan. 5, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.autoblog.com/2015/01/05/toyota-follows-tesla-

makes-hydrogen-patents-open-source/ [https://perma.cc/PMA3-ZKMT].
122. Jack Ellis, LG Has as Much to Gain from Its Open Innovation Drive as Korea's SMEs,
IAM (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.iam- magazine.comlblog/Detail.aspx?g=c4010b69e529-48ce-b83fdc2bce3d763c [https://perma.cc/2MRF-V7RG].
123. Jack Ellis, Asian Companies Lead the Way in Royalty-free Patent License Strategies, IM
(March 31, 2015), http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=Oa884580-e30f-4d5a-a827786dd0b10316 [https://perma.cc/XMR2-4D2P].
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liquefied natural gas engine technology with local entrepreneurs. 124
IBM, which has been the top filer of patents for years, Sony, Google, LG
Electronics, Canon, and over nineteen hundred other companies 12 5 are
signatories to the Open Invention Network's "non-aggression" pact,
which commits them to granting royalty-free patent licenses over Linux
126
technology.
Pledges have been used to advance patent holders' interests in
multiple ways. In communities where patents are seen as inconsistent
with a culture of innovation and cooperation, defensive pledges serve
recruiting, retention, and culture- and trust-building goals. Pledges can
also help build or boost a firm's reputation or facilitate the creation of
commons, or "zones of freedom," in support of open innovation. In a
number of these cases, the right to enforce the patent is reserved for
defensive purposes or in the case of bad faith (e.g., copying). However,
their overall aim is to lessen the risk of enforcement. The decision to
patent but forbear from enforcement creates a freedom to operate that
expands dissemination.
In sum, though modern Court decisions conceive of information27
inside the patent document as the quid pro quo of the patent system,
the patent system supports the diffusion of technical information
outside the patent document. As discussed in this Part, through
ancillary disclosures following the filing of a patent and licensing of the
patent, the patent holder shares with the world additional information
about the invention. Through freedom to operate, innovators enjoy
greater freedom to be inspired by, absorb, and independently stumble
upon the inventions of others.
III. IMPROVING THE CONTEXT OF PATENT DISCLOSURES
A. The Diffusion of Technical Information
The last Part argued for a broadened conception of patent
disclosure that, unlike conventional approaches, includes the diffusion
of technical information outside of, as well as within the patent
document. In this Part, I turn to the basic mechanics of the diffusion of
124. Id.
125. The OIN Community, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork
.com/community-of-licensees/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2015) [https://perma.cc/XD9G-MWR6] (listing
licensees as of December 13, 2015).
126. OIN License Agreement, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork
.com/joining-oin/oin-license-agreement/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2016) [https://perma.cc/UZJ6-QGUL]
(agreement effective May 1, 2012).
127. See supranote 5 and accompanying text (referring to J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)).
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technical information-that in order for teachings to be successfully
disseminated, the discloser must provide, and the recipient must
receive, relevant information or permissions. The search and
information costs of locating patents are often high. Parties are
transacting less than they otherwise could, reading patents less than
they would, and learning less than they could if both content and access
were improved. The extent to which society actually receives
meaningful teaching from patents and patent-related disclosures
depends not only on the patent's content, but on its context-for
example, facts about a patent's ownership, licensing, enforcement, and
the intents of the owner to, for example, hold the patent defensively,
enforce it, or license it. As Professor Joel Mokyr has argued, the mere
production of knowledge does not guarantee that others will be able to
exploit it.128 Effective diffusion of knowledge across researchers and
over time requires that individuals be aware of extant knowledge and
pay the associated costs to access and capitalize upon this knowledge.
Contextual information can reduce search costs by providing ways to
identify among a sea of unimportant patents the most important ones.
In the context of search, what contextual information matters
depends on the objectives of the consumer of patent information. When
seeking to understand what solutions are currently being implemented
in the market, ownership and assignment records make it possible to
identify the patents of competitors, and "marking" information, when
available, provides the patentee's association of particular patents with
specific products through physical or virtual marking. 129
For prospective readers of patents, these context clues, as well
as other indicia of a patent's value, can be used to locate relevant
patents. A study found that the licensing of patents, for example, serves
as a signpost for commercially valuable research, resulting in more
citations. 130 In the context of managing risk, other data points matter.
The likelihood of a patent's assertion depends not only on its value but
on whether it is in force and any pledges or commitments made to
license it. Only one to two percent of patents are ever litigated, and in
previous work, I have connected the eventual litigation of a patent to

128. JOEL MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

2 (2002).
129. MICHELLE K. LEE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT ON VIRTUAL MARKING 9-

11
(2014),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia-implementation/VMreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5XG3-PNKE] (providing an overview of the marking doctrine in patent law, and
the marking through virtual and physical means).
130. Kyriakos Drivas, Zhen Lei & Brian D. Wright, Academic Patent Licenses: Roadblocks or
Signposts for Nonlicensee Cumulative Innovation? 17 (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript)
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2489231 [https://perma.cc/FH8D-CX2T]).
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earlier events in the patent's life. Patents that end up in litigation have
markedly different characteristics than patents that do not. They are
more likely to be reexamined and cited, and are more likely to have
money borrowed against them. 131
A patent's context thus refers not only to the product of the
patent in its finished form, but to the process of prosecuting the patent
and what happens before, during, and after the patent issues. While the
enablement, written description, and best mode requirements police the
content of patents, several regulations and doctrines compel the
production and dissemination of context information about patents. As
described below, various forms of patent information are required to be
disclosed to government agencies including the SEC, FDA, DOJ, and
PTO. The marking doctrine in patent law rewards the designation of
products by the patents they embody.
One of the two enumerated duties of the PTO is to "be
responsible for disseminating to the public information with respect to
patents and trademarks."' 132 This duty is vested in both the Under
Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the PTO. 133 35 U.S.C. § 41(i)
also obligates the PTO to provide access to patent information
electronically. Various sections of Title 35 denote specific actions that
the Director of the PTO can take to disseminate information to the
public. 134 For example, § 10(a)(4) provides for publication of
information, including "annual indexes of... patentees," and § 10(b)
allows the Director to publish specified information about the patent.
Although the dissemination duty has not been the subject of litigation
or much commentary,1 35 the PTO has taken a number of affirmative
steps to carry out this duty.
However, as described below, even when statutorily required,
context patent data suffers numerous defects, including a lack of
compliance with reporting requirements, incompleteness, and a lack of
access to the disclosed information. The production and reporting of
other types of contextual information about patents, for example,
patent pledges, are largely unregulated and non-uniform across
131. Colleen Chien, PredictingPatent Litigation,90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 287-88 (2011).
132. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2) (2012). The "Dissemination Clause," 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2) (2012), was
added via the November 29, 1999 amendment to the Patent Act of 1952. Patent and Trademark
Office Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 2(a)(2), 113 Stat. 1536 (1999).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1) (2012).
134. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 9 (2012) (stating that the Director may furnish certified copies of
patents to the public); 35 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (stating what the Director may publish and in what
forms); 35 U.S.C. § 12 (2012) (stating the Director may supply copies of patents to public libraries
for access to the public).
135. This assertion is based on a search of Westlaw and Lexis Nexis, which yielded few
results.
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different contexts. Other contextual data that could reduce the costs of
transacting or adopting patented technology or managing the risks
associated with extant patent rights are not even being produced at
present.
Thus, while conversations about patent disclosure have mostly
focused on a lack of quality content, an overlooked aspect of the problem
is the lack of patent context. Contextual patent information is not
uniformly available at present, but making it so, and incenting further
disclosure, federation, and dissemination of patent context information,
could do much to reinvigorate the disclosure function of the patent
system. Below, I describe the different types of contextual patent data,
some of their limitations, and ways of addressing them.
B. Types of Contextual Information
If a patent's content comprises the technical content of an issued
patent-the words, drawings, and claims-the context of the patent can
be conceptualized as comprising successive layers of information about
or related to this content, as shown in Table 2. The first context layer
includes what I have, in previous work, described as the intrinsic
characteristics of a patent-the characteristics that the patent is "born
with," including the number of claims, the original owner of record, the
size of the time spent in prosecution, the prior art citations, and the
related patents. This information can be ascertained largely by
inspecting the front page of a patent or its file history. 13 6

136. Chien, supranote 131, at 298-99.
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TABLE 2: FORMS OF CONTEXTUAL PATENT DISCLOSURE
Contextual Layer

Description

Examples

Disclosures Within
the Patent Itself

Intrinsic characteristics of
a patent-characteristics
that the patent is "born
with"

* Number of claims
* Original owner of record
* Time in prosecution

Disclosures Within
The U.S. Patent

Acquired characteristics of
a patent that are captured

a Changes in patent ownership
* Size of the owner (e.g., small, micro-

Office

by the USPTO, often postissuance

9 Prior art citations

entity)
* Maintenance fees

&Citation to the patent
* Reexamination of the patent
e Post-grant challenges to the patent
(e.g., interpartes review)

* Recorded patent licenses
Disclosures in court proceedings
a Orange Book (FDA) disclosures
* Materials contracts involving the
patent (i.e., reported to the SEC)
e Bayh Dole Act disclosures

Patent Disclosures
Under U.S. Law

Disclosures outside of the
USPTO but compelled by
U.S. statutes

*

Disclosures Within'
The Int'l Patent
System

Information regarding
where else in the world the
counterpart patent is filed
and kept in force

a PCT applications filed in the WIPO
system
* Foreign-filed patent counterparts to
USPTO-filed patent

Disclosures Outside
the Int'l Patent
System But
Connected To The
U.S. Patent

Information outside the
patent but still associated
with the U.S. patent

*

Essentiality to a patent standard
Subject to a commitment to license
(e.g., on RAND or royalty-free
terms)
* Subject to a patent pledges
9 Availability of the patent for sale or
license, with or without "know-how"
*

or other forms of technology transfer

The second context layer contains "acquired" rather than
intrinsic characteristics of the patent. After a patent is granted, it can
take a number of different paths. Although patent studies tend to focus
on one of two stages in a patent's life, prosecution or litigation, a
number of other "events" can take place within a patent's life, giving a
patent its "acquired" characteristics. 137 These characteristics, captured
by the PTO, include changes in patent ownership, size, and other traits
of the owner that entitle her to pay reduced fees; investments in the
patent, including the payment of maintenance fees; correction or
reissue of the patent; reexamination of the patent; financing events
involving the patent, including the use of a patent as security; citation
to the patent; post-grant challenges to the patent, for example, through

137. Chien, supra note 131, at 299-308.
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interpartes reexam or covered business method review; and licensing of
the patent.
Contextual disclosures outside of the PTO, but compelled by a
variety of U.S. statutes, comprise a third layer of patent disclosures.
These disclosures generally fall into the categories of court disclosures,
regulatory disclosures, and marking disclosures. When patents are
asserted, facts about the patent become a matter of public record.
According to 35 U.S.C. § 290, trial courts must let the PTO know when
a patent is litigated, as well as when a judgment on such litigation is
13 8
issued.
Under FDA regulations, drugmakers must disclose patents that
they believe cover the branded drugs they market for publication in the
so-called "Orange Book." 139 Manufacturers that seek to market a
generic version of the drug must certify that the Orange Book patents
associated with the branded product are invalid, not infringed by the
generic drug, or have expired. 140 Pursuant to securities regulations,
public companies are required to disclose significant events that have a
"material" impact on the company's financial standing to the SEC,
including patent licenses. Invention disclosure obligations also form an
important part of the regulation of federally funded inventions. The
Bayh-Dole Act, for example, allows recipients of federal grants, such as
universities, to take title to inventions created using federal funds.
While it affords universities considerable latitude when exercising their
1
patents rights, it requires patentees to report any subject inventions1 4
developed based on federal funding and also, at the behest of the
funding agency, periodically report on utilization and efforts at
142
obtaining utilization.
The marking provisions of patent law incentivize the disclosure
of patent-product ties, not to any particular government agency, but to
the public at large. According to this doctrine, patentees may mark their
138. 35 U.S.C. § 290 (2012):
The clerks of the courts of the United States, within one month after the filing of an
action under this title shall give notice thereof in writing to the Director, setting forth
so far as known the names and addresses of the parties, name of the inventor, and the
designating number of the patent upon which the action has been brought. If any other
patent is subsequently included in the action he shall give like notice thereof. Within
one month after the decision is rendered or a judgment issued the clerk of the court
shall give notice thereof to the Director. The Director shall, on receipt of such notices,
enter the same in the file of such patent.
139. See Orange Book Preface, supra note 86.
140. Id.

141. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1) (2012).
142. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(5) (2012) (reporting obligations). Most agencies require reporting. Arti
K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded Research, 30
NATURE BIOTECH. 953, 954 (2012).
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products with the word "patent" or "pat." and the numbers of patents
that cover the product, for example, on the item itself or its
packaging. 143 If a product is so marked in a substantially consistent and
continuous way,14 4 the patent owner is entitled to favorable treatment
when the patent is enforced. More specifically, marking effects
adequate legal notice, which is required to collect damages for past
infringement when the patentee has put the patented apparatus into
practice. 145 If the patent is later found by a court to be infringed, the
owner of the patent is entitled to compensatory damages over the entire
period of infringement, rather than only after the patentee has given
1 6
actual notice. "
There are at least two other types of contextual information
associated with patents. Information within the international patent
system, for example, regarding where else in the world the patent is
filed and kept in force, comprises a fourth layer of patent disclosure.
Such information can have significant implications for the legality of
generic production and sales internationally. 14 7 A fifth layer of
disclosure includes information outside the patent but still associated
with the patent. Examples of this type of information include standards
that the patent is included in, commitments to license patents on RAND
or royalty-free terms, and patent pledges such as Tesla's public promise
to "open source" its patents and make them freely available.1 48 The
143. For an example of an item that is directly marked, see the coffee cup holder displayed in
the False Marking: Lobbying Against the Senate Bill article. Dennis Crouch, False Marking.
Lobbying Against the Senate Bill, PATENTLYO (Mar. 21, 2010), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/
03/false-marking-lobbying-against-the-senate-bill.html [https://perma.cc/3GN8-U6AA].
144. Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (describing
two ways that a patentee can provide adequate notice, (1) marking the patented product or (2)
notifying the infringer of infringement, and cautioning that, once begun, "patent marking must be
substantially consistent and continuous in order to satisfy section 287(a) and constitute
constructive notice."); see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 802-03 (2002) (describing the three ways
of providing notice: (1) commencing an infringement action against the defendant; (2) providing
actual, specific notice of the infringement, prior to the filing of the lawsuit; or (3) providing
constructive notice by means of patent marking, as set forth in Patent Act § 287(a)).
145. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2012):
In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any
action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be
recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for
infringement shall constitute such notice.
However, the marking doctrine does not apply in the case of method claims or patentees who do
not practice the invention, as described in Blair & Cotter, supranote 144, at 804-06.
146. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
147. See Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for AntiretroviralDrugs Constrain
Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886 (2001).
148. See Musk, supra note 118.
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availability of the patent for sale or license, with or without know-how
or other forms of technology transfer, also represents important
contextual information that may be provided through various private
sector licensing or sales platforms.
C. Improving Contextual Information
The neglect of contextual patent information has led to
omissions in reporting, compliance, and accessibility. Take the example
of the question of who owns a patent. Patent ownership is a critical
input into many of the diffusive mechanisms described above. In
technology transfer contexts, whether the patent is available for
licensing is often tied to the identity of the owner. In the case of
technical learning from the patent, likewise, ownership is key to
competitive intelligence analyses and can help a researcher connect the
patent to real-world, commercial embodiments, increasing the patent's
relevance and usefulness. Finally, in the risk management context, who
is behind a patent demand or lawsuit has tactical and strategic
implications. Who owns the patent and is funding the litigation has
relevance for the case's predicted outcome.
Despite the importance of ownership information, recording
ownership is voluntary. Even if the original owner is disclosed, the
patent may change hands, and there is no requirement that changes in
assignment information be updated, though current law protects
against certain types of fraud if such updating occurs. 149 Because there
is no recordation requirement, it is impossible to know with certainty
who owns a patent. Although the PTO, implementing an executive
action of the White House, recently undertook an initiative to close the
gap in ownership information, it ultimately concluded that legislative
authority was the best way to impose this requirement.150
Even when there are rules requiring the production of
contextual information, they are not necessarily followed. According to
35 U.S.C. § 290, trial courts must let the PTO know when a patent is
litigated, as well as when a judgment on this litigation is issued. 151 The
PTO is required, in turn, to include this information in the file of each

149. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
150. Attributable Ownership, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.uspto
.gov/patent/initiatives/attributable-ownership [https://perma.cc/3WRC-TRZN] (describing the
agency's promotion of a draft rule that would require patent applicants and owners to regularly
update ownership information and choose to withdraw the draft rule based on the public comments
received).
151. See 35 U.S.C. § 290 (2012).
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patent. 152 However, in an empirical review of six thousand online files
for patents known to have been in litigation, only sixty-five percent
contained the requisite notice of litigation. 153 Yet, knowing if a patent
has been previously litigated-and the outcome of this litigationclearly has significance for an invention's dissemination. If the patent's
claims are invalidated as a result of the litigation, for example, they
essentially enter the public domain, and are no longer the subject of the
patentee's exclusive rights. Astoundingly, this information is not
reported anywhere.
Patent information has also been underreported in the context
funded inventions. The Bayh-Dole Act allows recipients of
federally
of
federal research funding, such as universities, to take title to inventions
created using federal funds. While the Act affords universities with
considerable latitude when exercising their patent rights, it contains a
number of accountability safeguards to ensure that federally funded
intellectual property is used appropriately. Specifically, grantees must
report any subject invention 154 developed based on federal funding, and
also, at the behest of the funding agency, periodically report on
utilization and efforts at obtaining utilization. 155 But an analysis of
academic biomedical patents focused on the 1980 to 2007 period found
prima facie evidence of underdisclosure of even the government interest
in patents, 156 with a reporting rate of sixty to ninety percent among
known government-funded patents in the same period. 157 Utilization
data, which could be used to drive greater dissemination of federally
funded invention, is even harder to come by, due to concerns about
secrecy. 158
Yet this information is essential to several functions that
directly bear on how the invention is disseminated. Without it, it is
difficult for the government to determine whether to compel licensing
as it is entitled to in cases where the invention has not achieved
practical application. 159 More generally, the federal government cannot
152. See id.
153. Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The ALA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 65 (2013). The PTO started switching to online
patent files called "file wrappers" in the early 2000s. Id. at n.99. While the authors did not explore
the offline patent files, it is not expected that these files would have greater compliance with the
reporting requirements, and in fact, they may have worse compliance.
154. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1) (2012).
155. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(5) (2012) (reporting obligations). Most agencies require reporting. See
Rai & Sampat, supra note 142, at 954.
156. Rai & Sampat, supra note 142, at 954.
157. Id. at 955.
158. Id. at 954-55.
159. Id. at 953.
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effectively carry out its oversight role-as it has been said, if you can't
measure, you can't manage. 160
The poor state of reporting about federally funded inventions
has not gone unnoticed. Pointing to a U.S. Government Accountability
Office study that found institutional reporting of patent information to
be incomplete and access-restricted, the National Academy of Sciences
has recommended that federal research agencies should require
research institutions to reliably and consistently provide information
licensing agreements and utilization efforts. 16 1 The university
community, which would need to provide this information, has
suggested, in turn, that making the underlying databases with this
information more accessible and usable would induce better
reporting. 16 2 Currently, uniform search tools and ways of linking
potential users with federal and non-federal data and information do
63
not exist.1
Another context in which the lack of information has arguably
inhibited the diffusion of technology is licensing. Actual transfer of
technology from one setting to another through a technology license
requires a number of steps. Not only must the parties be willing to talk
to each other, a step arguably made easier for the seller by the
protective presence of patents, but the parties also need to find each
other, and then go through a series of other steps, including agreeing
on scope, price, and term before a deal can be signed.
Corporate patent holders are willing to license sixty percent
more patents than are currently licensed; 6 4 the number is likely even
higher among university patent holders. There is room for reducing
duplicative research. The European Union estimates that twenty billion
dollars are spent every year to develop innovations and technologies
that have already been built. 6 5 But to prevent this duplication, the
parties need to be aware of each other and willing to transact, and they
must agree on the terms of transfer.
160. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 10-11 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2011).

161. Id. at 11.
162. Higher Education Association, Comment Letter in Response to Request for Information
on the White House's Strategy for American Innovation (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/compiled rfi responses-redacted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
AK3C-SYR6] (responding to Question 23).
163. Id.
164. Alfonso Gambardella et al., The Market for Patents in Europe, 36 RES. POL'Y 1163, 1164,
1180 (2007) (reporting that while eighteen percent of European patents are offered for licensing,
only eleven percent are actually licensed).
165. Ashish Arora et al., Markets for Technology and Their Implications for Corporate
Strategy, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 419, 424 n.5 (2001).
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Why are technology transactions not happening more readily?
Some of the most frequently cited obstacles to licensing include search
costs in finding a technology licensee and friction in the licensing
transaction. There is no "universal marketplace" for technology in
which patentees can signal their willingness to license their technology
or potential buyers can express their desire to purchase technology or
patents. Specialized public and private platforms exist to advertise
patent purchase opportunities, 166 but the market has been
characterized as fragmented and "blind,"167 and it is difficult to connect
willing buyers and sellers.
Deal friction is also a problem. Within commercial contexts,
Professors Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella cite the buyer's fear
of a "winner's curse" because technology sellers can negotiate with a
number of potential technology buyers at the same time, leading the
winner to overpay. While this dynamic is not necessarily limited to
technology transactions, because of the unique nature of intangible
goods and the lack of an agreed-upon approach to technology valuation,
the parties lack a common price anchor, and therefore may be separated
by an unbridgeable distance in negotiations.1 68 University intellectual
property negotiations are often accompanied by similar friction and
delays.1 69 But if license data were reported more consistently and
available more readily, more data would be available and, through
transparency, would create greater trust between the parties. Licensing
data exists in pockets throughout the federal government, such as in
court records, SEC filings, PTO records, and government legal
departments monitoring outbound and inbound licenses. This data,
however, is very difficult to access, as it is hard to find and often, even
though it is government data, is locked behind confidentiality barriers
created, for example, by oversealing of court records and FOIA
exemptions. However, making license data available in sanitized form,
or limiting disclosure to expired licenses, could overcome some of these
barriers. Enabling publicly reported licensing data to be more readily
found and federated could go far to fill the gaps in our quantitative
understanding of how patents are valued and licensed.
The good news is that, under the auspices of the Open
Government Data movement, greater attention has been paid to the
importance of making existing patent data more accessible and
166. See, e.g., Patent Marketplace, IDEACONNECTION, https://www.ideaconnection.com/
patents/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7G8G-2BW4].
167. Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
257, 257 (2007).
168. Arora & Gambardella, supra note 107.
169. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 160, at 9, 10.

1884

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:6:1849

transparent. The PTO, under the auspices of the Office of Chief
Economist, has moved to make large quantities of contextual patent
data, such as prosecution facts, maintenance fee data, and assignment
and licensing data, more readily available. 170 The market has
responded, seeding over one hundred companies with open patent data
as of 2016,171 many aggregating contextual data from different sources
and making it more accessible to various communities of interest. To
cite just two examples, the company Covalent Data, which is focused on
supporting and encouraging technology transfer deals, aggregates data
not only on patent grants, but related applications, publications, grants,
adjacent technologies, and licensing policies associated with
technologies in order to help venture capitalists and other investors
determine whether they want to license technology from universities. 172
The company Innography combines U.S. prosecution, licensing, and
litigation data with international patent data, creating the ability to do
comparative analyses of coverage and technology trends. 173
Other government agencies with troves of patent data should
follow suit and enforce existing reporting requirements, take steps to
ensure its quality, and default to opening up this data in accessible and
meaningful ways on the earliest practicable timeframe. Across various
datasets, ensuring that data can be connected to each other, for
example, by patent number or unique patentee identifier ID, will
increase the usefulness of the contextual information.
Finally, capturing more contextual data from patent holders,
particularly about their uses of and intents for patents, could do much
to improve the diffusion of technical teaching. The marking
requirement suffers from gaps in coverage and use, and existing
marking data is not available except on a piecemeal basis. Yet knowing
what patents cover a technology can improve understanding of it.
Similarly, enabling patent pledges to be recorded in a registry,
including by third party beneficiaries, would make them more reliable

170. Research Datasets, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/
learning-and-resources/ip-policy/economic-researchlresearch-datasets
[https://perma.cc/XUR833BT] (describing numerous patent dataset releases "to support the study of the economics of
patents and trademarks").
171. See Comment Letter from Colleen V. Chien, Assoc. Professor of Law, Santa Clara Univ.
Sch. of Law, and Brian J. Love, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, to the
Hon. Michelle K. Lee, Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.uspto
.gov/sites/default/files/documents/casestudies f chien%26love_12feb2016.pdf
[https:/perma.cc/
94D5-QBKP].
172. COVALENT DATA, https:/covalentdata.com/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
T77M-VVWV].
173. Who We Are, INNOGRAPHY.CoM, https://www.innography.com/who-we-are (last visited
Sept. 4, 2016) [https:H/perma.cc/ET5B-DTAF].
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and legally enforceable. 174 Beyond that, creating more options for
patentees to express their intents for patents, by electing into a
"defensive only" option, or by indicating that their patents are available
for licensing, would also help technology producers and adopters more
readily find each other.
The PTO currently offers an option to list patents in the Official
Gazette as available for license or sale, upon payment of the fee set forth
in 37 C.F.R. § 1.21(i).175 In 2014, the PTO sought public comment on
expanding its capability to support the voluntary reporting of licensing
offers and related information for the PTO to make available to the
public. Such licensing information could include
willingness to license, as well as licensing contacts, license offer terms, or commitments
to license the patent, e.g., on royalty-free or reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. In
accordance with best practices in technology transfer, this information could also include
permitting a patent applicant or owner to include keywords, technical fields, and/or
descriptive information about the underlying technology, related technical papers and
publications, and desired attributes in a technology partner. 176

However, no action has been taken since that initial request.
Since 2012, the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") has
offered a similar option to report licensing terms and information to
PCT applicants in order to promote voluntary licensing. 177 In November
2013, it introduced the WIPO GREEN online marketplace, to promote
innovation and diffusion of green technologies. 178 Part of the problem
with these initiatives, however, may be that if patentees publicly
declare the availability of their patent for licensing, they may lose rights
to injunctive relief, as money damages should be adequate to
compensate for infringement of the plaintiffs intellectual property.
However, offers to exclusively license or to license on particular terms,

174. This idea is advanced by Jorge L. Contreras in Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543
(2015).
175. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE

1703 (9th ed. 2014) [hereinafter MPEP]. For examples of such listings, see U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, Patents and Serial Numbers Available for License or Sale, OFF. GAZ. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2012/weekO2/TOC

.htm#refl8 [https://perma.cc/5TAY-7QH3]; and U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Serial Numbers
and Patents Available for License or Sale, OFF. GAZ. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Dec. 11, 2007),

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/patlics.htm [https://perma.cc/G6TB-QT6B].
176. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Changes To Require Identification of Attributable
Owner, OFF. GAz. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/

sol/og/2014/week09/TOC.htm [https://perma.cc/4S2U-579F].
177. New PCT Licensing Feature,WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.: PCT NEWSLETTER (Dec. 2011),
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/newslett/2011/12/article-OOO1.html [https://perma.cc/H88Q-9CEQ].
178. WIPO GREEN-The Marketplace for Sustainable Technology, WIPO, https://webaccess
.wipo.int/green/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7TFL-LT5U].
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which indicate a conditional willingness to license, should not
necessarily give rise to such an inference.
IV. IMPROVING THE CONTEXT FOR READING PATENTS

A. Removing Obstacles to Reading Patents
Two other changes to the contexts in which patent disclosures
are accessed could improve the ability and desire of innovators to read
patents without additional investments in the ways patents are written
and examined. The first would be to address obstacles to reading
patents historically posed by the willfulness doctrine, which has
historically assigned treble damages to the knowing infringement of
patents. 179 While the extent of this deterrent effect is unknown, the
practice in some industries of largely "ignoring patents,"1 80 in part
because of a fear of the consequences, does not support learning from
patents. Like others, I recommend that this structural impediment to
patent disclosure be addressed.181
In Halo, the Supreme Court, interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 284, held
that courts have the discretion to treble damages in cases of "egregious
infringement behavior." 18 2 In reaching its decision, it eschewed the
previous, rigid two-step test of willfulness, which required proof of
objective recklessness by the infringer, and that the risk of
infringement "was either known or so obvious that it should have been
known to the accused infringer." 183
Though much will depend on how the Court's decision will be
interpreted by the lower courts, the decision seems to cut in two ways
with respect to reading patents. On one hand, Halo makes it easier for
courts to find willfulness, increasing the risks associated with
infringement and any acts that could contribute to the appearance of
deliberate copying.18 4 On the other hand, however, the decision also

179. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016) (citing the standard for
willfulness set forth by the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F. 3d
1360, 1371, i.e., that the patentee must demonstrate "that the risk of infringement 'was either
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer' "); see also Fromer,
supra note 12, at 588; Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 142
(2006) (describing the penalty for reading patents embedded in the willfulness standard).
180. See Lemley, supra note 48; see also FED. TRADE COMM'N supra note 84, at 80 (asserting,
based on testimony, that "IT firms frequently do not perform clearance searches when introducing
products, instead essentially 'ignor[ing] patents' ").
181. Fromer, supra note 12; Holbrook, supra note 179.
182. Halo Elecs. Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932.
183. Id. at 1930 (citing In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F. 3d 1360, 1371 (2007) (en banc)).
184. Id. at 1932-34.
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relaxed the connection between treble damages and specific knowledge
of the patent by shifting the focus from knowledge of the risk of
infringement of the patent (the second prong of the Seagate test) to
willful and deliberate copying and appropriation, in several of the cited
examples, of the plaintiffs product.1 8 5 If lower courts clarify that mere
knowledge of the patent, without indicia that the patentee took
advantage of the knowledge within the patent, won't trigger treble
damages,1 8 6 this could further reduce the risks associated with reading
patents. As a complement to such an action, administrators could make
it easier for patentees to search among expired and lapsed patents,
which members of the public should feel free to be able to read freely,
without penalty. There is currently no easy way to access just these
patents. To make the determination of whether a patent is in force,
members of the public need to go through a series of steps, including
checking the maintenance fee record associated with a patent and
checking the file history of the patent to see if the PTO gave any extra
term to the patent. These additional costs raise barriers to learning
from even expired patents.
B. Default to Open (EarlyPublicationand Publicationof Provisionals)
What also seems clear is that the most useful disclosures within
patents are, unsurprisingly, those that do not appear elsewhere, for
example, details from practice, protocols, and early disclosures of
products before they appear on the market. Though the built-in bias of
the patent system towards early disclosure results in less information
being available to the inventor at the time of filing, it also has the
advantage of producing a description of the invention that predates the
commercial embodiment.
Thus, another way to improve patent disclosure is to leverage
temporal
advantage of patents by creating options to make patent
the
disclosures available as early as practicable. Currently, certain patent
applications are never published, and patent applications that are
subject to publication requirements generally only publish eighteen
months after the first filing of the application. However, some product
cycles are short, and researchers sometimes do not read patent
specifications because they consider the information contained in them
185. Id. at 1932-34. The idea of shifting the willfulness standard to one that penalizes the
adoption of technology with knowledge that it was derived from the patentee, whether from the
patent or another source was previously described by Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri in
Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1085, 1116-19 (2003).
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to be outdated by the time it is publicly available.18 7 To the extent that
early publication does not undermine the incentive to patent, and may
even be helpful to the inventor, it should be encouraged.
Historically, publishing patent applications that have not yet
matured into patents has been disfavored in the United States. Other
countries have long required patent applications to be published after
eighteen months of filing, but the United States has resisted this rule
in the past on the basis that it would undermine the incentives to invent
and to disclose provided by the patent system. When the United States
finally adopted the international rule, as part of a package of measures
to harmonize U.S. and international law called the American Inventors
Protection Act, a group of twenty-four Nobel laureates harshly criticized
the change, claiming that it would be "very damaging to American small
inventors and thereby discourage the flow of new inventions."' 18
Though the change went forward, it did so with qualification, reserving
to applicants the option to elect secrecy if a patent is not foreign-filed.
Provisional patent applications are never published, also presumably to
18 9
keep inventors' secrets.
But despite the strong rhetoric, it is unclear that patentees
actually desire secrecy. According to a recent study of 1.8 million
granted patents filed at the PTO from 1995 to 2005, eighty-five percent
of inventors filing a patent since 2000 with the option of keeping their
patent applications secret chose not to,19° and even paid to have their
secrets revealed.191 Small inventors, about whom critics were
particularly concerned, were actually more willing to have their
applications published than large inventors.1 92
To the extent patent disclosures are useful, earlier disclosure
benefits the public. 193 But early disclosure can also benefit patentees.
First, it can enable patentees to stake out their position in a
187. Holbrook, supra note 179, at 143-45.
188. An Open Letter to the U.S. Senate, EAGLE FORUM, http://www.eagleforum.org/patent/

nobel-letter.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/P6A5-RSPA].
189. 1129 Request for Early Publication [R-11.2013], U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Nov. 4,
2015), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s1129.html [https://perma.cc/3F82-WNGT].
190. Stuart Graham & Deepak Hegde, Do Inventors Value Secrecy in Patenting? Evidence
from the American Inventor's Protection Act of 1999, at 2 (2013) (unpublished manuscript).
191. Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Can You Wait to Take Advantage of USPTO Fees Decreasing
January 1, 2014?, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com
2013/10/23/uspto-fees-decreasing-january-2014/
[https://perma.cc/EX9C-LVUD] (reporting the
three-hundred dollar fee that, until 2014, accompanied publication of a patent).
192. Graham & Hegde, supra note 190, at 7 (reporting that large inventors choose disclosure
over fifty percent of the time and U.S. small inventors choose disclosure over sixty percent of the
time).

193. Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failureand Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1, 30 (2013).
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technological area, 194 in some cases, leading to earlier licensing of the
invention. A study compared biomedical patent inventions published
eighteen months after the patent application with inventions that were
not disclosed until the patent issued. 195 Pre-issuance publication was
associated with an average reduction in the time to licensing by 8.5
months. 196 This difference was attributed to the earlier clarification of
the inventor's rights. Another benefit of publication is that it enables
applications that never mature into patents to be used as references
that the PTO can rely on when examining other patents, and thereby
prevent others from patenting the same idea by another. Currently,
forty-eight percent 197 of an estimated two million provisional patent
applications 198 are never even released to the public 99 because they do
not mature into utility patent applications. Further, a number of utility
applications are abandoned prior to publication. Assuming the patent
applicant does not otherwise intend to patent the idea, giving
applicants the option to publish the now-secret applications provides a
way to prevent others from doing so.
For these reasons, it is worthwhile to consider resetting the
defaults that apply to the publication of patents. 200 While the option to
publish a patent application upon filing, or "early publication,"
technically exists for utility applications, 20 1 the PTO could do more to
publicize and encourage the election of this option. For example, it could
make publication upon filing the default but enable applicants to opt
out. Government agencies that fund patented research, likewise, could
prioritize early publication for the inventions that they support and
fund. The PTO could also publish provisional applications upon
submission or after the one-year priority period has passed, but with
194. Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 173, 175 (2005).

195. Deepak Hegde & Hong Luo, Imperfect Information, Patent Publication, and the Market
for Ideas 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Strategy Unit, Working Paper No. 14-019, 2013).
196. Id.
197. Dennis Crouch, Abandoning Provisional Applications, PATENTLYO (Jan. 2, 2013),
[https:/lperma.ccl
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/0I/abandoning-provisional-applications.html
Q7RD-QKI (reporting a forty-eight percent provisional abandonment rate in 2011).
198. Dennis Crouch, ClaimingPriorityto ProvisionalApplications, PATENTLYO (Apr. 8,2014),
[https://perma.cc/
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014O4/priority-provisional-applications.html
RY39-FRU2].
199. When a patent application claims benefit to a provisional application, the provisional
application is accessible through the public electronic record of the application; however, such
applications are not available in bulk.
200. Many of these ideas are discussed in Colleen Chien, Why It's Time to Open Up Our Patent
System, WASH. POST (June 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/
2015/06/30/why-its-time-to-open-up-our-patent-system/ [https://perma.ccMRQ8-AN6G].
201. See 1129 Request for Early Publication[R-11.2013], supra note 189.
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the option for applicants to opt out of this publication. A combination of
these options would, in effect, create a "default to open" that would still
allow applicants to opt out of if they so choose.
CONCLUSION

In order to get a patent, an inventor, through her patent lawyer
or agent, must describe an invention in enough detail so that others can
make and learn from it. But the learning that the patent system
supports depends critically on a host of factors-for example, whether
the patent is in force, is commercially important, can be found by followon innovators or potential licensing partners, is held for defensive or
offensive reasons, and is published early enough and with enough detail
to matter.
In this Article, I have argued that we need to enlarge the concept
of patent disclosure to encompass not only the content of the patent, but
its context and to consider how the greater availability of contextual
information about the patent can promote the progress. This contextual
information represents not only the final "product" of a patent as issued,
but the "process" by which it is made and used, the timing and terms
on which it is provided to the world, and the publicly reported
transactions in which the patent is involved. Making contextual
information more accessible, defaulting to the publication of provisional
applications after they expire and the publication of utility applications
upon filing, and removing the penalty for reading patents would do
much to reinvigorate the disclosure function of the patent system-in
many cases, using already existing information.
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